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ABSTRACT
As the assigners of credit ratings and subordination levels, rating agencies play a critical role in the whole
CMBS market. In an effort to investigate their influence in this market, we analyzed the business models,
industry structure and rating methodologies of rating agencies. In addition, their functions in the capital
markets and CMBS markets are discussed. These findings are then applied in an attempt to explain the
variations of subordination levels. We found that rating agencies play a significant role in the below
investment grade CMBS market, mainly through their evolving credit assessing methodologies. However,
rating agencies' business models and structure of the CMBS rating industry are not considered to have
significant impact on subordination level decisions. It is found that most of the variations in the
subordination levels can be attributed to non-rating agency factors such as change in CMBS pool
compositions, change in CMBS loan structures and increasing scrutiny from the Below Investment Grade
buyers.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 SCOPE OF RESEARCH
Below Investment Grade market, also known as B-piece market, is a specialized area in the Commercial
Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS) industry. On the product side, sibordinate tranches involve high
credit risk and real estate risk. In addition, if the subordinate tranches cannot be sold, an issuer/undewriter
will have a hard time selling the rest of the bond. On the market side, only qualified players are allowed in
the market. Among the qualified players, few have the expertise, interest and capital to participate in the
market, which cause both the primary and secondary market to be illiquid. As a result, B-piece buyers
have tremendous influence over the structure of the security.
Many industry participants have noticed the uniqueness of B-piece market, but few studies have been
conducted specifically on the B-piece market structure itself. The purpose of this thesis is to explain the
trend of subordination levels i the below investment grade CMBS tranches. Since rating agencies are
primarily responsible for determining the subordination levels, a detailed study on rating agency will also
be included in order to investigate their influence.
There are many types of CMBS. A CMBS transaction can be backed by a pool (conduit) or by single
property (large loan deal). For conduits, there are fixed rate and floating rate transactions. Since rating
methodologies and subordination levels differ with each different type of CMBS transaction, our study
will focus mainly on fixed rate conduits in this thesis.
1.2 TREND OF SUBORDINATION LEVELS IN THE B-PIECE MARKET
In recent years, studies have documented the trend of subordination levels, particularly in the conduit
section of CMBS'. A study by Salomon Smith Barney in late 1999 showed that subordination levels had a
decreasing trend in the investment grade area, but remained stable in the subordinate tranches (BB and B)
(Wheeler, 2000). However, according to new available data, he below investment grade subordination
levels seemed to have decreased since 19992. This movement was interesting because it seemed to
coincide with the Russian financial crisis of late 19983.
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1.3 AREAS OF STUDIES
Many factors cause the subordination levels to change in the below investment grade area. In this thesis,
analysis will be focused on the influence of rating agencies since they are the assigners of subordination
levels. After introducing the below investment grade CMBS market in chapter 2, the rating agency
industry and their business models will be studied in chapter 3. Chapter 4 and 5 will be an analysis of the
rating agencies' role in the CMBS market and their credit rating methodologies. In chapter 6, these results
will be applied in order to explain the variation in subordination levels. We will complete the analysis by
examining factors other than rating agencies, as rating agencies may not exert as much influence in the
below investment grade analysis as they do in the above investment grade area.
Although sometimes considered as B-piece, Non-rated tranche or the equity tranche poses different risks
and thus requires different analysis. As a result, a study on the non-rated piece and equity tranches will
not be included in this thesis.
1.4 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
In our study, we reviewed CMBS rating methodologies published by different rating agencies. In
addition, we interviewed industry participants in an attempt to gain understanding of the market
dynamics. We also reviewed journal articles related to the B-piece CMBS market and subordination
levels.
We found that rating agencies are crucial to the development of the below investment grade CMBS
market, as rating agencies provide the industry with credit expertise and a common credit "language".
We also found that many factors affect the change in subordination levels in recent years. On the rating
agency's side, changes in credit assessment models help explain some of the variations in the
subordination trends. On the underwriting side, changes in CMBS pool compositions and loan structures
have improved the quality of the CMBS pools, which in turn decrease subordination levels needed. In
addition, increasing scrutiny from investors, especially the below investment grade buyers, improves the
pool quality indirectly by "kicking" out "bad loans". As pointed out by one of the rating agencies, this
factor is especially important to the subordinate pieces because their ratings are most sensitive to the few
"bad loans" or "offenders". Once these "bad loans" are removed, subordination levels in the B.piece
market improve. However, industry structure and business models of the rating agencies are not found to
affect ratings and subordination levels decisions greatly.
CHAPTER 2
BELOWINVESTMENT GRADE CMBS MARKET
2.1 INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES
The Product
A Commercial Mortgage-Backed Security (CMBS) is a bond backed by a portfolio of commercial real
estate mortgages. The CMBS structure allows the pass through of diversified interests in a portfolio of
commercial real estate loans to investors (Hess & Liang, 2001). Normally, CMBS are structured as
sequential-pay bonds and receive credit ratings from AAA/Aaa to below investment grade ratings. The
senior/subordinate structure of CMBS helps to provide extra credit support (credit protection) for the
senior classes. Principal payments, either scheduled or prepaid, are first distributed to the highest rated
classes, and then the next rated class, and so on. On the other hand, losses are distributed from the lowest
rated classes - first the Non-Rated class, then the B-pieces, and then the investment grade classes.
Why Invest in CMBS
According to Sally Gordon4 , investors buy CMBS because of the following reasons:
1. Risk Based Capital: For some investors, it is cheaper to hold bonds rather than mortgages, even at a
comparable yield.
2. Relative Value Investing: CMBS outperforms alternative investment in terms of yield advantage due
to smaller investor base, less liquidity, less information availability, less market efficiency and
investors' unfamiliarity with the asset.
3. Different Risk Profile: CMBS provides investors with an opportunity to take on more credit risk and
less prepayment risk (vs. Single Family MBS). However, CMBS picks up more extension risk than
Corporate Bonds. In addition, CMBS market is highly illiquid, especially in the Below Investment
Grade Market.
The Players
The CMBS investor base is broad and consists of investors with different objectives. Investors such as
insurance companies, money managers, investment banks, thrift corporations, pension funds, investment
advisors, foreign financial institutions and opportunistic funds are all interested in buying a certain class
of CMBS (Gordon, 2000). However, due to their different risk profiles and investment restrictions,
different investors are interested in different CMBS classes.
The Investment Grade CMBS market is dominated by companies that have risk-based capital reserve
requirements. These include pension funds and insurance companies that look for real estate exposure.
Pension funds only buy AAA classes because these classes are ERISA eligible. Other players that want to
pick up extra yield may buy mezzanine classes (A and BBB classes). According to an article published by
Hess & Liang (2001), the U.S. Department of Labor recently amended the ERISA regulations, and allows
pension funds to investment in tranches rated BBB-/Baa3 or above, even if they are subordinate to higher
rated tranches. It is unclear whether the relaxation of ERISA requirements will attract pension funds to
expand their investment to other tranches.
The B-piece investors are more opportunitistic and usually hold the higher risk bonds for longer-term
investment.
The non-rated tranches are often retained by the issuers. Sometimes, these classes are privately placed due
to the confidential information involved.
Market Development and Recent Trends
The development of CMBS has been well documented. According to an investor's guide published by
Bear Steams (1999), while the origin of CMBS can be traced to the early 1980s, it was in the early 1990's
that the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) accelerated the development of the CMBS market. RTC
created the model and platform for the new financing outlets. Issuance started to pick up as more and
more commercial real estate mortgage holders look for ways to decrease their holdings. Traditional
commercial real estate lenders began to use CMBS to increase the liquidity of their portfolios and to
recapitalize their equity base. These institutions are motivated by the new capital requirements that made
it more attractive to hold investment grade mortgage securities in their asset bases than to hold whole
loans.
Hess and Liang, "Trends in the US CMBS Market", Real Estate Finance, Spring 2001
(Original data from Commercial Mortgage Alert)
According to Hess & Liang (2001), who obtained data from Commercial Mortgage Alert, CMBS volume
peaked in 1998 at about $80 billion. Volume decreased slightly to $68 billion in 1999 and stabilized in
2000.
CMBS Issurance by Year
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2.2 THE B-PIECE (BELOW INVESTMENT GRADE) CMBS MARKET
The Product
B-pieces generally refer to the subordinate classes that carry below investment grade ratings: BB/Ba2 and
B/B. The function of these tranches is to enhance the senior classes through over-collateralization.
Overtime, credit enhancement can build up when loans are retired. Rating agencies may review the
transaction and decide to upgrade the ratings.
There are many differences in structure between investment grade CMBS and non-investment grade
CMBS. Sally Gordon (1999) provided a good summarized comparison between highest rated classes and
lowest rated classes:
Features of Highest and Lowest Rated Classes
Highest Rated Class Lowest Rated Class
Paid off first Paid off last
Lowest yield Highest yield
Least likely to suffer loss Most likely to suffer loss
Shortest average life Longest average life
Most subordination Least or no subordination
Source: Sally Gordon, "How to build a bond", CMBS World, Volume 1 Number 3
E&Y Kenneth Leventhal, a real estate consulting firm, points out that when making investment decisions,
B-piece buyers analyzes different features of a CMBS transaction:
" Attributes of the underlying collateral, including property performance and mortgage underwriting;
" Structure for the CMBS cash flows and how these cash flows maybe affected by mortgage
prepayments and defaults;
o Role of third parties and their potential impact on B-pieces' values;
" Rights and role an investor will gain with respect to loan workouts and REO decisions, plus
regulatory impacts.
With non-investment ratings, B-pieces are expected to have higher default rates than those of investment
grade tranches. According to a bond default study published by rating agency Fitch IBCA, Duff & Phelps
(Fitch), the default rate of these CMBS tranches had been low compared to other bonds for the decade
The non-investment grade CMBS average annual default rate was only 0.14% during 1990-1999,
compared with 3.07% of default rate in the corporate bond sector (Lans & Price, 2000). One of the
reasons why CMBS default rates have been low maybe due to the healthy real estate condition since the
early 1990's real estate downturn (Lans, 1999). Recently, in an updated default study report, Lans & Cain
(2001) point out that default rate of CMBS has risen despite almost perfect economic conditions.
Cumulative CMBS default rate has risen from 0.54% one year ago to 1.02% by May 2001.
Annual Default Rates
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Source: Lans and Cain, "Perfect to a Default: 2001 CMBS Conduit Loan Default Study", Fitch IBCA, May 2001
Although B-pieces are considered risky investments and have bss demand than above investment grade,
they are a critical element in successfully selling the bond. Without buyers willing to invest in subordinate
pieces, issuers have no choice but to warehouse the most risky pieces. Most issuers are unwilling to do so,
especially after the lessons learnt during the 1998 Russian financial crisis: Capital America and CRIIMI
MAE, the two largest players that warehoused a lot of risky CMBS classes, incurred tremendous losses
when the spread widened significantly (Riddiough, 2001). Thus, most issuers are willing to negotiate with
potential B-piece buyers in modifying the structure of the portfolio until they are able to successfully
place the B-pieces. Thus, B-piece buyers exert tremendous influence not only on pricing, but also on the
structure of the security itself.
The Market
The below investment grade CMBS classes, or B-pieces, started in 1996 (E&Y Kenneth Leventhal,
1997). The B-piece market functions differently from its investment grade counterpart. Investment grade
tranches are usually sold at near par value. B-pieces, on the other hand, are longer term "buy and hold"
discount investments (CSSA, 1997). Due to the real estate expertise that is required to truly value these
securities, the B-piece market is very illiquid. Since most of the B-piece buyers are long-term holders and
the issuance of these classes are usually small, there is no active secondary trading market for these
classes. Most of the classes are sold through private negotiation when a CMBS is issued5 . Due to the
limited number of players participating in the market, B-piece buyers exert huge influence to the
structure, portfolio composition and even ratings of CMBS. Further explanation about this relationship
will be discussed in the next chapters.
The Players
Investors in the below investment grade markets are subject to Rule 144A (private placement rule)(CSSA,
1997). These buyers, known as Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIB), are large financial institutions that
are allowed to trade unregistered securities among themselves (Brealey & Myers, 1991).
As the holder of the subordinate pieces, B-piece buyers look for higher yield by taking additional credit
and real estate risks. Most B-piece buyers are sophisticated investment firms that have real estate
expertise and want real estate exposure. In addition, these firms have ample knowledge in asset
management as special servicing affects the yields of these classes greatly. Due to the tremendous real
estate and credit risk involved in the these below investment grade classes, investors perform detailed due
diligence on the portfolio as well as the underlying collaterals.
Subordinate bonds have become more popular, as investors are pricing the risks more accurately either
through the aid of real estate joint ventures or increasing knowledge of the products. In secondary trading,
subordinate bonds are becoming more liquid because of improving collateral information quality (Gichon,
1999).
Before the Russian financial crisis in 1998, the B-piece players are usually third party money
management companies, special servicers, investment banks, pension fund advisors and mortgage
REITs6. CRIIMI MAE, a mortgage REIT that actively participated in the CMBS B-piece market, went
bankrupt after the crisis. According to Commercial Mortgage Alert, the B-piece sector was "battered
during the bond-market downturn in 1998, which effectively killed a group of mortgage REITS that were
formed to invest in the high yield market."
After the crisis, only about handful of B-piece players remain. Most of the buyers concern about the
relative low return compared to other investments. Many B-piece buyers are not impressed by the typical
blended return for the below investment grade classes of CMBS - 15-18% on a leveraged basis.
Opportunistic investors want return of 20% or more, so they are placing their bets elsewhere7.
Today, the B-piece market functions like a "club" in the sense that there is close relationship between the
investors and the issuers. The issuers know the investors well and they know each player's risk appetite.
The B-piece market is also referred to as "The Cartel" by some in the industry, because of the influence
exerted by a small number of investors in shaping CMBS pools (Commercial Mortgage Alert, 2000).
According to Commercial Mortgage Alert, B-piece players (with various degree of participation)
currently include the following companies8:
o Allied Capital
" Lennar Partners
" GMAC Commercial Mortgage
" ARCap
" Insigna Opportunity Partners
o Lend Lease
o Anthracite Capital
" Banc One Capital
o G2 Opportunity Fund (Joint Venture between Richard Rainwater & GMAC)
Nowadays, many B-piece buyers look to the Re-REMIC market and the Collateralized Debt Obligation
(CDO) market for exit strategy. With these additional exit channels that can serve as risk-shifting
vehicles, more investors may be willing to participate in this market in the near future. Furthermore, the
growth of CDO market may even serve as a pull force for financial intermediaries to buy more below
investment grade and mezzanine tranches to put into pools of CDO issues.
The B-piece CMBS market is a unique and important one: Only a limited number of players are present in
the market but they exert a lot of influence on the structure of the bond. Having learnt this, their influence
on the trends of subordination levels will be revisited in Chapter 6. After acquiring a preliminary
knowledge about the product of CMBS and the B-piece market, the business model of the rating agency
industry will be studied. Then, as subordination levels are related specifically to ratings, meaning of credit
ratings will be explained. A discussion of why rating agencies exists as an intermediary in the capital
markets will be provided. Afterwards, the economic and revenue models of each of the three largest
international rating agencies, which together account for 100% of the U.S. CMBS ratings, will be
provided. The influence on subordination level determination based on rating agencies' industry structure
will then be discussed at the end of the chapter.
CHAPTER 3
THE RATING AGENCYINDUSTRY
3.1 WHAT IS A CREDIT RATING
A credit rating is an invaluable tool for investors (Asiamoney, 1999). According to the rating agency
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's), a rating is "an opinion on the future ability and legal obligation of
an issuer to make timely payments of principal and interest on a specific fixed income security. A rating
measures the probability that the issuer will default on the security over its life, which, depending on the
instrument may be a matter of days to 30 years or more. In addition, long term ratings incorporate an
assessment of expected monetary losses should a default occur."
Although credit rating agencies pay attention to past credit records, credit ratings are "primarily intended
to measure the risks associated with future debt servicing capability. They are meant to assess risk
through cycles and not be overly influenced by temporary events." (Asiamoney 1999)
According to Moody's, since ratings only measure the credit risk component of an obligation, it does not
measure other risks that may be involved in fixed-income investment. These risks may include liquidity
risk, currency risk, interest rate risk, and in some case prepayment risks. Unlike stock ratings, credit
ratings are not intended to measure a security's potential for price appreciation. These are not buy or sell
recommendations, merely an indication at a moment in time of the issuer's ability to repay that debts
(Moody's, 1994).
Ratin' symbols
Different rating agencies utilize different rating symbols. The following is a chart that compares different
ratings across different agencies:
Investment Grade Ratings Speculative Grade Ratings
Moody's S&P and Others Interpretation Moody's S&P and Others Interpretation
Aaa AAA Highest Quality Bal BB+ Likely to Fulfill
Ba2 BB Obligation; Ongoing
Ba3 BB- Uncertainty
Aal AA+ High Quality BI B+ High Risk
Aa2 AA B2 B Obligations
Aa3 AA- B3 B-
Al A+ Strong Payment CCC+ Current Vulnerability
A2 A Capacity Caa CCC to Default, or in
A3 A- CCC- Default (Moody's)
Baal BBB+ Adequate Payment Ca C In Bankruptcy or
Baa2 BBB Capacity D D Default, or Other
Baa3 BBB- Marked Shortcoming
Notes: The other agencies listed in the table use the rating symbols of the second column, with the exception of
DBRS (H and L symbols in place of+ and -) and CBRS (H and L symbols in place of+ and -, and +
symbols that correspond to second and third letters). The agencies follow a variety of policies with respect
to the number of ratings symbols given below B-.
Source: Cantor and Packer, "The Credit Rating Industry", FRBNY Quarterly Review, Summer/ Fall 1994
Role of Ratings
The role of ratings, according to Moody's, is "to provide, through a simple symbol system, objective and
independent opinions of relative credit risk that investors can use as a supplement to, but not as a
substitute for, their own internal credit research. Although often used as such, ratings are not predictors of
default." (Pinkes, 1997). In another report, Moody's explains that ratings are "intended to provide capital
market participants with a framework for comparing the credit quality of debt securities. A credit rating
compresses an enormous amount of diverse information ito a single symbol. Credit quality embraces
relative default probability, loss severity, 'financial strength', and 'transition risk"' (Moody's, 1999).
Ratings in the CMBS area
Rating agencies use the same long-term credit rating for both fundamental and Structured Finance
obligations, including ratings in the CMBS area. The rating agencies further explain what ratings mean in
the CMBS area:
Standard & Poors
According to Standard & Poor's (1999), a CMBS credit rating is "an opinion on the ability of the
collateral to pay timely interest and repay principal by the rated final distribution date, according to the
terms of the transaction. The rating does not reflect the impact of prepayment or any other factors that
may affect investor's yields but is only an opinion about the credit risks associated with the transaction."
Moody's
Moody's (2000) points out that CMBS ratings "reflect Moody's opinion about the credit quality of the
underlying mortgage loan pool, the structural and legal aspects of the certificates, and the extent to which
the mortgage loan pool's cash flow is sufficient to make payments due under the certificates. Moody's
seeks to ensure that credit enhancement afforded to each class of certificates is consistent with expected
loss for each rating category."
3.2 WHY DO RATING AGENCIES EXIST IN THE CAPITAL MARKET
Rating agencies have existed in the capital market for about a century. They have benefited the capital
market in several ways:
Credit Assessment (Rating Assiknment)
The major function of the credit rating agencies is to provide credit assessment on financial obligations
backed by various sources. For example, major international rating agencies such as Fitch, Moody's and
Standard & Poor's provide credit ratings on financial obligations backed by corporate, municipalities,
countries and derivatives. In recent years, rating agencies have been heavily involved in rating fixed
income instruments in the Structured Finance area.
Rating agencies represent the investors, not the issuers (Cantwell, 2000). By providing a credit rating on a
fixed income security, rating agencies help investors to assess the credit worthiness of the issuers and the
collateral backing the issues. With a letter-rating system, investors are able to compare a particular debt
issue with other issuances. This is equivalent of creating a scaling system where investors can better
analyze the credit risks associated with fixed-income securities. Ratings also create efficiencies in fixed
income markets by providing reliable, credible and independent assessments of credit risk.
According to Moody's (1994), ratings provide investors with the following uses:
" Widen investment horizon - Even sophisticated investors such as large financial institutions may not
have the resources to analyze every potential debt instrument available to them. Rating agencies, by
providing ratings, widen investors' investment horizons to a wider variety of market segments across
different industries, countries, and securities types.
o Set Credit risk limits - For many investors, ratings are used primarily as a benchmark for setting
"yes/no" or "buy/don't buy" limits on fixed income purchases.
o Calculate Credit risk adjusted yields - In well-developed markets, investors use ratings as a critical
element in pricing the risk premiums in the securities they buy.
Ratings may be valuable for investors for other reasons:
o Monitor existing issuance - If the credit quality of an issue change, rating agencies may downgrade or
upgrade the rating, depending whether the change is positive or negative.
o Lower research cost - Ratings reduce the cost of research by providing an objective benchmark for
investors to judge companies and their specific bond issues (Asiamoney 1999).
On the other hand, issuers obtain benefits by having their issuances rated by rating agencies (Moody's
1994):
o Wider access to capital - For ratings assigned by reputable rating agencies, issuers can have a wider
access to capital, as various investors can easily understand the ratings. This helps increase the
liquidity of the issuance.
o Financing Flexibility - The wider market access helps issuers to reduce financing cost, particularly for
highly rated issuers. The higher the rating, the less the perceived likelihood of default, and thus the
smaller the premium demanded by investors for holding that debt.
o Market Stability - Ratings and reports can help investors to understand the credit strength of an
issuer, thus help to maintain investors' confidence, especially during market stress when short term
events may temporarily distort the long term credit worthiness of the issue.
With lower research cost and a comparable credit risk benchmark system, rating agencies help increase
liquidity and market efficiency of the capital market. More investors are willing to participate in the areas
they have less knowledge about. It also helps issuers to be able to reach a larger potential investor pool.
Rating agencies definitely played a critical role in the development and expansion of the capital market in
the past century.
Independent Opinion
Credit rating agencies are not the only institutions that provide credit assessment. Other financial
intermediaries such as investment banks and commercial banks also issue credit reports to investors.
However, it is the rating agencies' independence that set them apart from other credit opinion providers.
Since credit reports issued by the sell-side are considered somewhat biased due to alignment of business
interest, investors turn to credit rating agencies for an unbiased judgment. For example, Moody's points
out independence as a major reason why its rating is desired: "Although quantitative to some extent,
credit analysis relies heavily on judgment, requiring that ratings be provided by an independent,
experienced organization. Moody's is independent of any government or financial institutions. Its analysts
have no direct involvement in trading or sale of securities, instead focusing exclusively on credit
analysis." (Moody's, 1991)
Information Provider
Rating agencies continuously collect information relevant to the issues rated. Because of their position,
rating agencies have the ability to obtain confidential information not available to investors. Although
rating agencies cannot disclose this information, they can nonetheless incorporate the information into
their analyses. Issuers can share information with rating agencies freely as they are granted "insider"
status by the Securities and Exchange Commission (Cantwell, 2000). Thus, rating agencies are in effect
obtaining the information for the investor's behalf.
Research
Credit analysts at rating agencies are generally regarded as experts in the field. As financial products
become more complicated, investors look to credit rating agencies to provide advice. When new financial
products are created, issuers and investors will work closely with rating agencies to develop a risk
analysis method that is understood and acceptable by the industry. For example, rating agencies have
been heavily involved in assisting the development of risk analysis for the Structured Finance products.
Regulatorv
Many regulations have tied their monitoring criteria to credit ratings. For example, in 1989 ERISA
allowed pension funds to invest in high-rated asset backed securities rated A cr higher. Recently, the
relaxation of ERISA allows investors to invest not only in highly rated classes, but all the way down to
classes rated BBB/Baa9 . The Basel Committee is also proposing to use credit rating agencies to set bank-
capital requirementso. More examples of how ratings are used by regulatory bodies can be found in the
following table:
Securities laws |
Use of Ratings by the Regulators
The rating from an NRSRO (notionally recognized statistical rating organization)
may be included in the registration without obtaining the NRSRO's written
consent.
Disclosure burdens are minimized by using abbreviated forms and incorporation of
information by reference for rated securities.
Mortgage securities receiving one of the two highest ratings are treated as US
government securities for purposes of state blue-sky laws unless the state acts to
override this.
Calculation of broker-dealers' net capital requirements are based on the ratings of
the securities held.
Exemption from certain reporting requirements on rated securities transactions.
Permission to trade future contracts on non-US sovereign governments
Purchases of investment grade municipal securities during underwriting.
Eligibility for investment by taxable money market funds, including aggregate risk
limits, single risk limits and downgrades linked to bong ratings of NRSROs.
Exemption from registration and regulation of certain mortgage- and asset-backed
securities of investment grade.
Permission for a company to acquire securities of persons deriving more than 15
nercent of the gross revenue for securities-related activities.
Savings association Eligibility for investment in any of the 4 highest rating categories.
The 4 highest rating categories qualify as liquid assets.
Additional capacity to lend to highly rated borrowers.
Favorable risk weighting for capital requirements.
FDIC Eligibility for investment by FDIC-insured banks.
Capital calculations of state-chartered banks.
Eligibility and valuation of assets to be pledged by foreign banks whose deposits
are insured by FDIC.
OCC and the Fed Investment eligibility of assets and valuation for capital determination, and
margining requirements are based on agency ratings.
NAIC Valuation of securities held for investment purposed for reserve requirements and
for capital adequacy.
DOL Eligibility for pension fund investments.
States Eligibility for investment by state-regulated entities such as insurance companies,
public retirement funds, state chartered banks, and thrift institutions.
Other Self-regulatory organizations such as NYSE, PHLX, and NASD set margin
requirements based on the type of security pledged to secure a loan.
Source: Caouette, Altman & Narayanan. Managing Credit Risk. Ch.6
The above table shows that regulatory bodies do utilize the widely recognized and accepted system of
credit rating to help them achieve different monitoring purposes.
In summary, rating agencies play a critical role in the capital market. The rapidly expanding capital
market creates inefficiency because investors cannot correctly analyze the credit risk of all the products
present in the market. Investors maybe able to do so, but the analyses will incur high costs. Credit rating
agencies fill the inefficiency gap by acting as the provider of credit assessment services at a relatively low
cost. Consider an institutional investor that would like to diversify the risk of the portfolio by purchasing
some bonds in other countries. The investor will have a better risk estimate when a foreign bond is rated
by one of the credit rating agencies. The investor will be able to compare the risk to other known products
in his or her country, and thus make a better-informed decision. If the bonds are not rated, the investor
will need to spend significant amount of money and time to acquire the information needed in order to
make the decision with same level of understanding. Thus, rating agencies will continue to exist as long
as this market inefficiency is present.
3.3 MAJOR RATING AGENCIES
There are three major credit rating agencies in the U.S.: Fitch IBCA, Duff & Phelps (Fitch), Moody's
Investors Service (Moody's) and Standard & Poor's (S&P's).
Fitch IBCA, Duff & Phelps (Fitch)
Fitch IBCA is the world's third largest rating agency. Fitch's parent company is Fimalac, a diversified
conglomerate from France. Fitch IBCA's successful acquisition of Duff & Phelps in 2000 has reinforced
Fitch's position as one of the three major international rating agencies. In October 2000, Fitch acquired
Bankwatch, the world's leading specialist bank rating agency'".
Moody's Investors Service (Moody 's)
Moody's Investors Service was founded by John Moody in 1900. The company published manuals that
provided information and statistics on stocks and bonds of financial institutions, government agncies,
manufacturing, mining, utilities and food companies. Later, Moody's offered investors with analysis on
security values by expressing his conclusions using letter-rating symbols adopted from the mercantile and
credit rating system that was used by the credit-reporting firms since the late 1800s. Moody's was
acquired by Dun & Bradstreet in 1962 and went public in 2000.
Standard and Poor's (S&P)
The company started in 1860 when Henry Varnum Poor published information on U.S. railroads and
canals. In 1941, Standard Statistics and Poor's Publishing merged to form the Standard and Poors
Corporation, which was subsequently acquired by McGraw Hill in 1966. S&P provides financial
information and analysis in both the equity side and the debt side of financial market. It also created the
S&P 500 Index *' which is used by many portfolio managers as a benchmark index".
3.4 BUSINESS AND REVENUE MODELS OF MAJOR RATING AGENCIES
Fitch
Business Model
Similar to the other two major rating agencies, Fitch rates issues in the areas of Structured Finance,
Financial Institutions, Corporate, Project Finance, public Finance and Sovereigns. Other non-rating
services include credit information services such as CreditDisk and BankScope. According BIS data
obtained by Economist, Fitch rates 27% of banks and 8% of companies.
Revenue Model
Fitch receives fees from issuers, insurers, guarantors, other obligors, and underwriters for rating
securities. Such fees generally vary from $1,000 to $750,000 per issue. In certain cases, Fitch will rate all
or a number of issues issued by a particular issuer, or insured or guaranteed by a particular insurer or
guarantor, for a single annual fee. Such fees are expected to vary from $10,000 to $1,500,000 14
In 1999, 75% of Fitch's revenue came from Asset-Backed Securities (Structured Finance). 12% of
revenue came from publications and sales, another 12% came from corporate, financial institutions and
insurance and only 1% came from sovereigns and public finance. Most of the revenue was derived from
USA (73%), 18% from Europe and the rest from other countries. Sales in 2000 was Euro 241 million,
with an operating margin of 26.5%15
Moody's
Business Model
Moody's currently offers ratings on sovereign, municipal, corporate, Structured Finance and derivative
issues. In addition, it assesses strengths of financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies. It
also provides analysis on mutual funds and risk management service. Its customers include investors,
depositors, creditors, investment banks, commercial banks, and other financial intermediaries, and a wide
range of corporate and governmental issuers of securities (Moody's, 1999). According to the Economist,
Moody's rates 80% of banks and 78% of corporates. On the other hand, Moody's has also been gathering
risk-modeling expertise, most recently by linking up with Oliver Wyman, an American financial-services
consultancy.
Revenue Model
Moody's charges issuers for appraisal and rating fees ranging from $1,000 to $1,500,000, depending on
the types of securities'6 .
According to Moody's Year 2000 Annual Report, approximately 33% of total revenue came from
Structured Finance rating. Moody's has also changed its revenue model and increase its dependency on
annual fees transaction based pricing. About 50% of Moody's revenue in fiscal year 2000 came from
sources other than rating fees on individual bond issues. The use of Internet has also increased rating
subscription over the web. Relationship-based rating fees now represent over 1/3 of Moody's total
revenue, while research sales and other non-rating businesses account for almost 15% of the total
revenue. Revenue in year 2000 was about $600 million, with 47.8% operating margin.
Standard & Poor's
Business Model
The business model of S&P is more complicated than the other two rating agencies. Standard & Poor's is
a firm that provides various financial services. Credit rating is only one of its many services. According to
BIS data obtained by the Economist, S&P covers 37% of banks and 66% of companies. The different
businesses of S&P can be classified into the following categories 7 :
o Credit Market Services - Provides objective financial information, credit ratings, and risk analysis to
the global financial community.
o Funds - Serves the needs of mutual fund investors with analysis, advice, and database resources
o Information Serivces - Delivers financial information and investment advice via the Internet, CD-
ROM, print, and direct feeds to corporate Intranets.
o Risk Solution - Offers a range of products and services to meet the credit risk management needs of
financial institutions worldwide.
o Structured Finance - Covers the global markets for securitized and credit derivative transactions
o Index based products - such as S&P 500 and other composites, including S&P REIT Composite
index.
According to its parent company McGraw Hill, S&P is diversifying its business and try to reduce its
dependency in the ratings business. It is also providing rating evaluation services, a confidential, definite
assessment of how potential acquisition, debt issues, stock repurchases, recapitalizations, consolidations
and other actions that impact a company's credit worthiness and credit rating. In addition to the various
business information services already in service, new products such as School Evaluation Services, a
rating systems on school district performance, and RatingDirect, an electronic distribution system that
delivers financial information to top institutional markets, will also provide new sources of income.
In the real estate finance area, S&P also has minority equity investment in MortgageRamp.com and
Percept Corporate, two newly formed Internet commercial mortgage origination and trading exchanges.
S&P will work with these new exchanges to provide underwriting and credit reviews online for the
auction of commercial real estate loans. S&P recently acquired Charter Research, an on-line CMBS
information provider. S&P says that it is committed to providing information as it pertains to its ratings,
and thus meets the need of investors.
Revenue Model
Standard & Poor's receives compensation for rating obligations. Such compensation is based on the time
and effort to determine the rating and is normally paid either by the issuers of such securities or by the
underwriters participating in the distribution.
According to its annual report, about 68% of S&P's revenue in year 2000 came from U.S. Operating
revenue for year 2000 was $1,280 million, with a 31% operating margin. Operating margin has been in
the low 30% for the past three years19.
3.5 RATING AGENCIES IN THE CMBS INDUSTRY
Revenue in CMBS rating industry
Based on CSSA information, rating agencies typically charge approximately &10 basis points of the
principal balance20. For example, a transaction of a principal amount of $500 million will cost an issuer
$450,000 to $500,000 for ratings per agency. Usually, credit ratings from two to three rating agencies are
required by investors. In a rough estimate by CSSA, this account approximately 20% of total fee of
securitization.
Rating Agency Market Share
Cumulatively, Fitch has rated most CMBS (59% of total amount of rated debt, based on dollars
outstanding, in 2,199 ratings.) Moody's has a 55% market share (1,439 ratings) and S&P has rated 53%
of issuance (1,624) ratings (Fitch, 2001). According to Commercial Mortgage Alert, for the first half of
2000, Moody's has a 78.1% market share, Fitch with a 60.4% market share and S&P with 56.9%. Since
each issuance required more than one rating agencies to assign ratings, the market share numbers do not
add up to 100%.
3.6 MONITORING OF THE RATING AGENCY BUSINESS
Rating agencies have been viewed as independent intermediaries that render opinion on credit risk. The
situation has been generally true for the past, when rating agencies took a more passive role in rating.
Usually, rating agencies do not solicit ratings. Rather, an issuer will request a rating before it issues a
debt. With the development of the Structured Finance market, issuers can work closely with rating
agencies to establish structures of the financial products. Investors start to question the unbiased position
of the rating agencies, as their dependence on profit derived from issuers increased. In addition, some
rating agencies are increasing their involvement in non-traditional credit services and non-credit services,
such as S&P's purchase of an online mortgage-trading platform. As pointed out by the Economist,
"Rating agencies are for profit organizations. In their drive for new revenues, credit rating agencies are
opening themselves up to conflicts of interest2 1". To put it in different words, there is concern about
whether an opinion on credit risk rendered by rating agency is independent or not.
Nonetheless, rating agencies are still perceived as the unbiased financial intermediaries in the capital
market because they do not participate in selling issues they rate. Historically, rating agencies have been
doing a good job in terms of monitoring themselves. Cantor & Packer (1994) argued that the disciplines
provided by reputation considerations appear to have been effective for the ratings industry. With their
reputations on line, it is at the rating agencies' best interest to maintain their independence and avoid
potential conflicts of interest.
Credibility is crucial for credit rating agencies. If an agency losses its credibility, investors will have less
confidence in its analysis and thus put less weight on its ratings and opinions. The market disciplines
require a rating agency to sacrifice short-term profits for long-term reputation. In that case, when
investors are dissatisfied with the rating, they will likely bypass the offering and buy other deals. Thus, in
order to survive in the rating business, rating agencies have to constantly provide accurate credit rating,
otherwise they will lose future business opportunities.
A similar argument can be obtained from the accounting industry. Accounting firms derive their revenue
from rendering audit opinions to companies, and in order to maximize profit, the natural choice is for
them to give audit opinion to as many firms as possible. However, this is not the case, because accounting
firms will rather sacrifice revenue by not rendering unqualified opinion to firms they perceive as risky.
Since accounting firms recognize their credibility as their most important business assets, they try to
maintain their independent positions
Second, competitive pressure from other agencies may actually be beneficial to the investors. According
to one investor, business competition helps keep rating agencies to be more accurate in their credit
opinion. Without competition, rating agencies will tend to be more conservative in their ratings, so as to
protect the agencies' reputation. However, investors will not get the best analysis from the agencies.
Competitive pressure from peer agencies thus provides checks and balances for the rating agencies to
provide more accurate ratings.
According to a report published by Federal Reserve Bank of New York, major rating agencies are all
either independent or owned by non-financial companies. The authors of the article agreed that the
ownership structures of the U.S. rating agencies do not generally present serious conflict of interest
problems (Cantor & Packer, 1994).
Then, how can one explain the changing market shares in the ratings business? One has to recognize that
ratings agencies are not the same. They may have similar rating methodologies, but each agency derived
their own analytical models and they often have different opinions on similar issues23. In addition,
different rating agencies have different business agendas and product focuses. For example, Fitch derived
about 75% of its revenue in 2000 from the Structured Finance area, but both Moody's and S&P have a lot
less exposure to Structured Finance products as compared to Fitch. With different rating agencies taking
different business risks, it is not surprisingly to see some rating agencies putting more resources in a
particular business area and thus building a better reputation for themselves in that area.
Sometimes a rating assignment is won not because of a better rating or lower subordination level, but
because of better services or reputation. For example, Moody's is reputed to be able to provide timely
feedbacks to issuers in the CMBS area24. Since timing is extremely important to issuers and underwriters
because of capital market's influence on the collateral's values, many underwriters prefer to work with
rating agencies with better services and in this case the ability to meet deadline.
Needless to say, some rating agencies have better reputation in particular sectors, and are preferred by
investors. In those cases, opinion from these agencies will be weighed more heavily by both the investors
and the underwriters, who usually choose the rating agencies. From some investors' standpoint, they
prefer to see Moody's and S&P's ratings on a deal because their charters require one of the two This
explains partly why Moody's and S&P are sometimes preferred by the issuers because they want the
issues to sell better. On the other hand, some issuers take a random approach and try to work with
different rating agencies throughout the years 25. All these factors have nothing to do with subordination
levels, but they determine which rating agency gets the business.
As a result, we believe there is not a high degree of correlation between subordination level and the way
the rating agencies industry is structured. The stakes are too high for rating agencies, especially the
reputed ones, to risk their long-term business credibility for short term profits by winning transactions.
Nonetheless, this question is neither unique nor new to the rating agency industry. Even in 1993, the early
days of CMBS, investors had similar concerns on ratings26 . Since rating agencies are acting as
intermediaries in the capital market, disciplines in the public market will force these institutions to take
actions ensuring their long term survival, which is to be independent and earn credibility with the
financial community. Or else, these agencies would have lost business long time ago and investors would
have gone to alternative sources for credit benchmarking and advisory. With relatively clean historical
record (few lawsuits against rating agencies), acceptance by the regulators, and disciplines in the capital
market, credit opinions from rating agencies can be regarded as independent.
CHAPTER 4
ROLE OF RA TING AGENCIES IN THE CMBS B-PIECE MARKET
The next step is to study how rating agencies rate CMBS and determine whether the common practice in
rating Structured Finance products such as CMBS will affect how the subordination level is determined.
First the common CMBS rating process and how the practice affects subordination level determination
will be described. Subsequently, the role of rating agencies in the CMBS market will be summarized, and
an analysis of the rating agency business structured will be provided.
4.1 RATING CMBS
4.1.1 THE RATING PROCESS
Rating process for Structured Finance transactions, including CMBS, is different from that of corporate
issuance. Since CMBS transactions can be "structured" with appropriate investor protections to achieve
desired credit ratings, there may be iterations of certain parts of the rating process as issuers restructure
the securities into their most profitable and most marketable forms (Moody's 1994).
From a timetable published by CSSA, one can see that the rating process is one of the most important
parts of the whole securitization process, and rating agencies are heavily involved in the process27 .
Transaction Timetable
Week I
Activity
[nitial analysis
Due diligence phase
Structuring process
Rating agency review
Selection of Servicer and Trustee
Legal documentation
Private Offering
Public Offering
Pre-marketing of privately offered
securities
Marketing/ pricing
Private Offering
Public Offering
Closing
Private Offering
Public Offering
Key Participants
CA - Certified Accountant
IB - Investment Bank
RA - Rating Agencies
SC - Seller's Counsel
1i b |4 1s 16 17 |8 |9 110111|12|13I14|15|16 Responsibilities
SL, IB
SL, IB
SL, LB
SL, IB, US, SC
SL, IB
IB, RA, TA, SV
IB, RA, TA, SV
IB
IB, CA, TA, UC, SC
IB, CA, TA, UC, SC
SL - Seller
SV - Servicer
TA - Trust Accountant
UC -Underwriter's Counsel
The general rating process for rating a CMBS transaction is summarized below 28:
Staze I. Preliminary discussion (Quote stage)
At the quote stage, discussion between the rating agencies and the issuer begins. An underwriter may send
preliminary data (called "tape") that contains collateral information to the rating agencies. Rating
agencies will response to the underwriters with their assessment of credit risk and structure quickly
(usually within a week).
Stage II: Selection staae
Underwriter will select two or three rating agencies based on several criteria. Often it is based on the level
of subordination, as it determines the size of Aaa/AAA an issuer can sell. According to an underwriter,
every issuer analyzes all rating agencies' subordination levels and the economic impact of those
29
subordination levels before they choose the rating agencies . Sometimes it is based on other criteria such
as a rating agency's ability to rate a particular type of transaction, or a rating agency's service.
Occasionally, when an underwriter wants a particular rating agency to be on a transaction, it may change
the pool composition to suit the requirement of that rating agency. With increasing bargaining power, B-
piece buyers now have a lot of influence in determining the final pool composition by "kicking" out loans
they do not desire. Sometimes, the B buyers are involved (in the form of bidding) even before the
30transactions are shown to rating agencies
Stage III: Rating decision and dissemination
When the rating agencies are selected, underwriters and issuers will send them collateral information to
aid the credit rating process. Information such as legal documents, appraisal reports, engineering reports,
environment assessment and underwriting documents are all sent to rating agencies. In addition, draft
versions of prospectus are also sent to the lead analysts for comments.
At this stage, due diligence of the underlying mortgages (called "file reviews") are performed. Data on a
property such as operating statements and rent rolls are reviewed. Analysts also travel to properties to
perform site inspections.
After analyzing the underlying collateral and pool portfolio, an analyst will come up with final credit
assessment and the final structure of the pool. If the underwriter accepts, then the transaction is
preliminary completed, and the underwriter will go on the "road show" to try to sell the above investment
grade pieces. If the underwriter is not satisfied with the rating, it can modify the structure or the
composition of the collateral pool and resubmit to the rating agencies. The rating agencies will re-evaluate
the pool and assign credit assessment based on the new structure. In this way, the underwriter is able to
achieve the best form of the security they desire.
Stage IV: Credit monitoring
After the ratings are assigned, rating agencies continue to monitor the performance of a transaction. For
example, early amortization may build up credit support and certain classes may be eligible for upgrade.
On the other hand, a certain sector of real estate may be facing difficulty (for example, the theatre
industry in 2000), and rating agencies will pay close attention should the event affect any pools
containing such credit.
Most rating agencies conduct their rating processes similar to the one described above. As mentioned
before, timing is a critical criterion for an underwriter to decide whether an agency will provide feedback
at a particular time or not.
4.1.2 HOW IS CREDIT ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURED FINANCE PRODUCTS DIFFERENT
FROM CREDIT ANALYSIS OF OTHER PRODUCTS
Most credit rating agencies approach the rating of Structured Finance in a way that is consistent with
rating methodologies in other sectors.
For example, Moody's adopts a "Universal" approach to credit analysis. It uses a multidisciplinary or
"universal" approach to risk analysis, which aims to bring an understanding of all relevant risk factors and
viewpoints to every rating analysis. Then credit analysts will make the judgment to weigh different
factors in light of a variety of plausible scenarios for the issuer and thus come to a conclusion on what the
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ratings should be
Corporate or Fundamental Credit Analysis
Rating agencies provide similar rating approaches to corporate or industrial credits. Since credit analysis
for corporate sector have existed for a very bng time, credit assessment of these credit have become more
standardized across different financial sectors. Nonetheless, different financial institutions put emphasis
on different criteria when analyzing credit risks.
Standard and Poor's provides an excellent summary of rating corporate credits. Corporate rating
assignment is a result of the analysis of the entire industry and a particular company's strength within its
industry. The rating agency looks at a vast array of factors that could affect the industry's overall
performance and uses a format that divides the analytical task into several categories, providing a
framework that ensures all salient issues are considered32 :
Business Risks
" Industry Characteristics
o Competitive Position
" Marketing
- Technology
= Efficiency
- Regulation
o Management
Financial Risks
" Financial Characteristics
" Financial Policy
" Profitability
" Capital Structure
o Cash Flow Protection
o Financial Flexibility
For corporates, the first categories are oriented to fundamental business analysis; the remaining categories
relate to financial analysis. Each category is scored in the course of the ratings process, and there are also
scores for the overall business risk profile and the overall financial risk profile. There are no formulae for
combining scores to arrive at a rating conclusion.
According to S&P, a rating decision may be influenced strongly by financial measures. At other times,
business risk factors may dominate. If a firm is strong in one respect and weak in another, the rating will
balance the different factors. Viewed differently, the degree of a firm's business risk sets the expectations
for the financial risk it can afford at any rating level. The analysis of industry characteristics and how a
firm is positioned to succeed in that environment establish the financial benchmarks used in the
quantitative part of the analysis.
Other rating agencies adopt a similar approach, with slight differences. Moody's approach is very similar
to that of S&P's 33 . On the other hand, Fitch places more weigh on financial ratios34 .
Rating a Structured Finance Transaction
Structured Finance transactions typically involve full range of structured securities such as mortgage- and
asset-backed securities, or what is often termed "securitization". These securities are term "structured"
because, by choosing different types and amount of assets and structural features, these securities may be
structured to achieve a desired rating level (Moody's, 1994).
Compared with the corporate credit sector, the Structured Finance sector is relatively young and is still
undergoing significant changes in terms of analysis. Many analysts in the financial markets are still trying
their best to improve the approach towards pricing as well as risk assessment of Structured Finance
products.
For example, Moody's focus of analysis on Structured Finance is different from that used to evaluate the
fundamental, unsupported credit risk. However, the meaning of expected loss experience associated with
structured financings ratings is comparable with those for any other debt obligations rated by Moody's.
Thus, there is a consistent and comparable meaning to the same ratings assigned. Since Moody's ratings
measure the probability that an issuer will miss a payment on the rated bond and the likely severity of loss
to investors if a default occurs, the same rating system can be used on assessing credit risk in the
Structured Finance area. When a default occurs, the ratings on a Structured Finance transaction are
intended to measure the probability (frequency) of default on expected payments and the expected
severity of loss when a default occurs (Moody's, 1994).
Specifically, Moody's adopts the expected loss approach on the underlying assets. It analyzes the
following items when rating a transaction35 :
o Analysis of historical loss data - A detailed analysis of historical data relevant to the loss
performance of the underlying assets is performed. Then an analyst will weigh the frequency, severity
and the timing of loss to determine a probability density function of future loss from collateral.
o Credit analyses of obligors - Analysts assess the credit strength of the specific obligor whose
obligations back the deal. In addition, following risks are considered:
o "Pool risks other than credit risk - Other risks that may reduce total expected cash flow from the
underlying assets are considered.
o Cash flow versus market-value transactions - When the content of the underlying asset is "marked to
market", then the credit quality of the pool should be analyzed.
o Structural and Legal risks - CMBS transactions have many legal and structural features that protect
investors. Features such as bankruptcy remoteness and distribution priorities greatly affect an
investor's ability to receive cash flow.
o Risks in internal credit support - Senior/subordinate with a multi-class structure can help generate
internal credit support by shifting the credit risks to different tranches. The rating agency makes a
separate analysis of expected impact to each class, because each class may differ significantly in
terms of credit risks and cash flow.
o Quality of external credit support - Insurance policies, letter of credit, corporate guarantees are
important examples of external credit support that may enhance the credit quality.
o Servicing and administrative risks - Quality of servicer is important in the Structured Finance area
because a servicer is responsible in collecting payments on behalf of investors, which directly affect
the amount of cash flow an investor can receive.
However, ratings on particular structured securities may indirectly reflect market risk, but only to the
extent that market risk of asset backing the security will affect the risk of credit loss on the security
itself36.
Why are ratinz agencies assigninz subordination levels instead of the underwriters in Structured Finance
Usually, ratings are the only products assigned by the rating agencies in the corporate bond area.
However, in addition to ratings assigned, subordination levels are also given or "determined" by the
rating agencies in the Structured Finance area. This is an interesting phenomenon because in other areas
of capital markets, issuers or underwriters are the ones that determine the capital structures of the
issuances. Afterwards, rating agencies will rate the securities as they are. However, this is not the case for
Structured Finance products such as CMBS.
The main reason why underwriters "outsource" the subordination determination function to rating
agencies is probably because of efficiency consideration. When one compares the Structured Finance
rating procedures with that of corporate bonds, one can find that Structured Finance allows underwriters
or issuers to alter virtually everything about the security in order to achieve a desired rating (for example,
changing the pool composition or adding other forms of credit enhancements). In order to compare the
two procedures fairly, let us now assume an underwriter is not willing to alter anything about the security.
Even in that case, an underwriter will be better off "outsourcing" the subordination levels determination
function to rating agencies. Because by "outsourcing", rating agencies will determine the "right
subordination level", or indifference point and present the results to the underwriters. Underwriters can
then use this indifference point and start the negotiation process. This enables both parties to minimize the
amount of communications needed to achieve a win-win situation- underwriters get the best out of the
proposed structured, and rating agencies feel comfortable in putting their ratings on an issuance.
Let us now consider the case when an underwriter or an issuer decides it wants to determine the
subordination levels of a security. First, an underwriter will need to accumulate knowledge of how rating
agencies determine subordination levels. Although some rating agencies publish their rating
methodologies, some do not. An underwriter will need to spend extra effort (money and time) in
researching and reassembling rating agency models. In addition, more staff time is needed after rating
agencies provide their feedback (in this case, only ratings). Now we can see that it is in an underwriter's
best interest to minimize this process and "outsource" the subordination level determination function to
the rating agencies.
Comparison of the corporate rating method and the Structured Finance rating method
In order to facilitate risk comparison across all types of instruments, rating agencies typically use the
same rating symbols (long term rating symbols) to rate structured financing and all other types of
obligations.
Sometimes, investors are confused about the true meaning of the ratings across different sectors as they
involve very different analytical approaches, and rating agencies have noticed the concern. To ensure
investors understand that their ratings are consistent across different sectors, Moody's published a report
in 1999 to explain the "Evolving Meaning" of Moody's ratings. In the report, the agency points out that
ratings are intended to provide capital market participants with a framework for comparing the credit
quality of debt securities. The agency explained that in the corporate sector, defaults (events of loss) have
been relatively common but loss severities (degree of loss) have been unpredictable. The bulk of
investment-grade corporate bonds have been held by institutional investors, who are generally averse to
default risk (irrespective of severity) but nonetheless the agency have an overall expected-return
orientation. Responding to the needs of such investors, Moody's ratings on industrial and financial
companies have primarily reflected relative default probability, while expected severity of loss in the
event of default has plated an important secondary role. In the speculative grade portion of the market,
which has been developing into a distinct sector, Moody's ratings place more emphasis on expected loss
than on relative default risk.
In the Structured Finance sector, where default probabilities and expected loss severity are often
estimated through statistical analysis, the agency's ratings have placed greater emphasis on the expected
loss concept, which places roughly equal weight on default probability and loss severity. Moody's
explained that largest institutional investors - who tend to take a highly sophisticated approach to the
assessment of expected loss - have dominated this market from its inception. Moreover, because of the
ability to divide a structured security into multiple tranches, this market is better served by ratings that
place a heavy emphasis on expected investor loss (Moody's, 1999).
In terms of issues rating agencies focus on, corporate rating approach emphasizes the ability of the issuer
itself to pay interest and principal. However, Structured Finance approach is more concern about the
credit risks of each pool, its external and internal credit supports and put less emphasis on its issuer. Cash
flow is probably the most important criteria in rating a Structured Finance transaction.
In the corporate area, rating agencies have accumulated about a century worth of default data.
Corporations do not usually issue debt obligations frequently (relative to say, mortgage originations).
Nonetheless, corporate default data is believed to be very accurate because of the long history and the
large number of issuing firms. However, this is not the case for Structured Finance. Structured Finance
has a relative short history, and thus there is less available data on default history of underlying collateral.
Due to the higher frequency of origination, the database is expected to improve dramatically in the future.
In essence, rating agencies try to provide a comparable rating system across different sectors. However,
due to different structures of different financial products, they design different rating approaches to better
estimate the credit risks associated with these products.
Impact on subordination level determination
Rating process for Structured Finance products has definitely more impact on subordination levels than
corporate bonds. Although the rating processes of both sectors consist of communications between issuers
and rating agencies, there is certainly more involvement of rating agency in shaping the structure of a
security in the Structured Finance area. Actually, the ability to present rating agencies with different
scenarios in order to achieve a desired rating is one of the major appeals to issuers of the Structured
Finance securities. Because the rating process allows more communications between the parties, it gives
the issuers more flexibility in structuring the best transactions they are able to create. "Best" transactions
may mean best selling price to the issuer, or best structure that a potential investor desires. Whatever the
meaning maybe, an issuer's ability to modify a structure during the rating process certainly has great
impact on the subordination levels.
4.2 ROLE OF RATING AGENCIES IN THE CMBS MARKET
Rating agencies' roles in the CMBS market are similar to those in the capital market, which are described
in Chapter 3. In order to avoid repetition, we will only provide a summarized version in this section.
Credit analysis is the most important function rating agencies perform in the CMBS market. Rating
agencies help the CMBS market to achieve a higher efficiency by assigning credit ratings to different
CMBS transactions.
Research and education are also two important tasks rating agencies perform in the CMBS market. Many
industry participants have credited the rating agencies in helping to develop the CMBS market in the early
1990's. Rating agencies have helped the CMBS market to expand in the early 1990s when the market was
still at its infant stage. Rating agencies have provided research and methodologies to the industry and
helped make the product more "commodity like" and gain more acceptance by the capital market,
according to Moody's Investors Service. S&P echoes the opinion and says that rating agencies have
helped the CMBS industry by devising a "technology" to fit non-homogenous CMBS transactions into
the secrutization process which usually contains more homogenous assets37 . On the other hand, rating
agencies have also kept pace with the changing faces of CMBS and published many research reports to
aid investors and underwriters to better analyze CMBS. New analytic models such as Moody's
(Economic Diversity ModelTm) and Fitch (Property Market MetricTm.) help investors to assess the real
estate diversity risk in the CMBS pools.
Rating agencies are also monitors of the rated transactions. They perform surveillance functions and may
change their original ratings if changes happen in the rated pools. In addition, rating agencies pay
attention to servicers of CMBS. In Structured Finance, servicers are very important, as they are
responsible for daily management of the transaction as well as workout trouble loans. The proven ability
and financial strength of the commercial mortgage servicers are vital to the overall rating of the issue
(Olasov, 1995). By assessing the credit quality of the servicer, the rating agencies help investors to better
assess their ability to obtain cash flow. Some rating agencies assign ratings to servicers, while others
incorporate the quality of servicer into their general ratings.38
Nowadays, rating agencies not only assess individual CMBS offering but also the issuers, providing
another layer of analysis for investors (PriceWaterhouseCoopers & Lend Lease, 2001).
Last but not least, credit ratings are also being used by the regulatory authorities and industry index (such
as Lehman Brothers Commercial mortgage-Backed Securities Index). Without ratings, these
organizations have to find another substitute for benchmarking.
4.3 DO RATINGS MATTER IN THE CMBS MARKET
Many investors, as well as underwriters and issuers, often question the necessity of ratings 39. One can
definitely apply the same question on the CMBS industry. In order to answer this question, one has to
first separate the question into several parts: 1)Do ratings matter to CMBS investors? 2) Do ratings matter
to CMBS issuers? 3) Do the existence of ratings help the CMBS market, in terms of lowering cost and
increasing liquidity?
Do ratings matter to CMBS investors
Ratings matter to CMBS investors; although ratings have different impact to different investors. First, let
us consider the AAA/Aaa buyers. They are usually established financial institutions that are looking for
real estate exposure but do not necessary have real estate expertise. Many investors also have to satisfy
regulatory requirements, which usually limit them to invest only in products with certain ratings cutoff.
To these investors, ratings serve as risk benchmarking and satisfying regulatory requirements.
For below investment grade investors, the story is different. Many B-piece buyers perform in depth due
diligence for the tranches they are interested, and then determine their investment decisions (as well as
price) based on a list of factors. Credit rating is included as one of the factors, and serves as a risk proxy.
However, B-piece buyers rely less on ratings than their investment grade counterparts. Nonetheless,
ratings are important to these investors. As one subordinate buyer puts it, "The investment decision
begins with the ratings. 40
Then one can ask, if ratings mean less to the below investment grade buyers, why not just rate the above
investment grade tranches? Even if ratings mean less to below investment grade buyers, pressure from the
above investment grade buyers may require ratings in the below investment grade classes. Similar to
many products in the Structured Finance area, CMBS's tranches are inter-related. Credit loss in the
subordinate area will affect the risk as well as yields in the senior classes. It is natural for investment
grade buyers to ensure that their investment is well protected by ensuring the subordinate support is
adequate. One of the best and efficient ways is to require ratings for the subordinate classes. With the
subordination levels rated, there are more information and risk signaling for the senior buyers. Thus, even
if the B-buyers put less emphasis in using ratings in their investment decisions, other factors such as
demand from the investment grade buyers will influence the underwriters' decision in whether the whole
transaction is rated.
Do ratings matter to CMBS issuers
Ratings do matter to CMBS issuers. Consider the following: First, ratings have been critical in helping to
develop the Structured Finance and the CMBS market. When an investment product is new and
unfamiliar to investors, efforts are made to make it look and act like more familiar, established products.
One of the obvious ways of doing so is to obtain an acceptable rating from an established rating agency.
The rating agencies maintain stringent credit standards and provide a common credit language. They can
perform an important service in bringing new credits to the market (Caouette, Altman & Narayanan,
1998).
Even when the CMBS market enters into a more mature stage, ratings are still important to issuers.
Rating agencies provide a link between the issuers and the bondholders41 . This situation is especially true
for Structured Finance products. According to Caouette, Altman & Narayanan (1998), the focus of market
shifts from what the issuer wants to what the investor wants. Structured Finance issuer now looks at
demand of investors and then structures a security to satisfy investors demand. By providing the capital
market a common credit language, rating agencies aid the issuers to bring new credit to the market
(Caouette, Altman & Narayanan, 1998). As a result, issuers can always explore new structures that are
best suited to the changing demand of investors. Without the common credit language, issuers will have
to incur a lot more cost in explaining and selling a new proposed security to investors, which in iam
decrease liquidity of the market and lead to inefficient pricing. Sometimes investors cannot buy a
particular issue because they are bound by regulatory requirement to only invest in products with certain
ratings. By having a security rated, the issuer satisfies the need of investors, as well as regulators, at the
same time with a much lower cost.
Do ratimis matter in the CMBS market
Since ratings matter to the issuers and the investors, one can conclude that ratings do matter in the CMBS
market. In summary, rating is necessary to CMBS because it provides a common credit language to many
participants of CMBS, including issuers, investors, underwriters and regulators. This lowers transaction
costs and increases acceptance of the product, which in turn icreases liquidity of the market. Ratings
help issuers to design new products that appeal to investors, and communicate to investors in an efficient
way. Even if ratings may not be as important in the investment decision making process in the B-piece
markets as it is in other classes, it is nonetheless critical in facilitating the trading of the CMBS market.
CHAPTER 5
DETERMINA TION OF BELOWINVESTMENT GRADE SUB-ORDINATIONLEVEL
In chapter 4, the roles of rating agencies in the CMBS market were discussed. Among their different
roles, rating agencies exert most of their influence by assigning subordination levels for the proposed
CMBS structures. In this chapter, rating agencies methodologies to determine subordination levels will be
studied. By understanding their views and methodologies, one can better understand how credit rating
agencies influence the development of the B-piece market.
5.1 MEANING OF SUBORDINATION LEVEL
When mortgage pools are not strong enough to support a securitized instrument on their own, credit
enhancement is necessary to add strength to the instrument. The most common form is
overcollateralization, which means the collateral value exceed the amount of bonds (Perry, 1994). Credit
enhancement means the extra credit needed to support a particular collateral given a certain rating.
Subordination is one of the credit enhancement methods available to a CMBS structure. Subordination
means that some classes of bondholder receive principal repayment before other classes, even as some
classes duffer losses before others, i.e., there is a priority of principal payment. Thus, the security
structure has in effect reallocated risk among different classes. Some classes, such as below investment
grade classes, assume greater risk of loss and therefore demand higher rewards, hence the higher yield42 .
The sequential payment structure has effectively enhanced the credit worthiness of a bond class by
increasing the probability that one class will be repaid principal, at the expense of another class having
increased probability of suffering losses. Hence the notion that subordination levels provide credit
enhancement" to a bond. So the credit risk is disproportionally allocated (Gordon, 1999). The
determination of subordination level of a tranche basically depends on what level of "protection" is
necessary for the rating assigned to that tranche. By requiring a 30% subordination level for a Aaa/AAA
class, the rating agency is in effect saying that 70% of the total size of the transaction can be rated
Aaa/AAA (i.e. 70% of the total will have 30% subordination behind it). Furthermore, by requiring a 25%
subordination level for a AA/Aa rating, the next lowest, the size of the next class can be 5% of the total.
The sum total of all classes below Aa/AA will thus be 25% (Gordon, 1999).
Standard and Poor's (1999) provides a similar meaning on credit support, "Credit support is the amount
of protection from losses that each class of securities requires at each rating category. The amount of
recommended credit support is a function of the aggregate characteristics of the loan pool and will
depended on the projected losses for each loan during various economic stress environments".
In summary, with everything being equal, the higher the credit support, the riskier the class is perceived
by the rating agencies as more credit enhancement has been built in.
5.2 RATING AGENCIES' DETERMINATION OF CMBS SUBORDINATION LEVELS
Rating agencies have similar rating approaches in determining the credit risk of CMBS. All major credit
rating agencies look at debt service coverage and loan to value ratio of the collateral pool as the two most
important keys in determining the loss frequency and severity of the bond. Then, rating agencies look at
portfolio issues such as diversity to fine-tune their analysis. Moody's rating approach will be provided as
an example, and then we will compare its methodology with those of the other two major CMBS rating
agencies.
For Moody's Investors Service, it combines both commercial real estate and Structured Finance analysis.
Based on commercial real estate analysis, the agency determines the credit quality of each mortgage loan
and calculates an expected loss on a loan specific basis. The pool's expected loss is then adjusted for
issues such as concentration, information, legal risk, and structural issues consistent with Structured
Finance analysis (Rubin & Levidy, 2000).
Under Structured Finance, credit enhancement needed to achieve a rating level for a proposed
securitization typically depends on the expected frequency, severity and timing of future losses. But since
commercial mortgages are not uniform in characters, and relevant historical loss information is limited,
Moody's analyzes the fundamental real estate credit risk of each asset to estimate the frequency and
severity of losses within the legal and structural framework of Structured Finance. Moody's also
considers diversification effects on the portfolio (Rubin & Levidy, 2000).
To assess credit risk, Moody's first performs a cash flow analysis on the underlying property based on
information provided by the issuer and other third party reports. Cash flow generated by the underlying
property is important in CMBS because it is the primary source of funds to pay debt service, as well as
the basis of the property's value (Moody's, 1991). Documents such as financial statements, rent rolls,
appraisal reports, engineering reports, seismic and environmental reports (Rubin & Levidy, 2000). Site
inspections are also conducted.
Then an appropriate stabilized capitalization rate is applied to the property to determine the Loan-To-
Value ratio of the property. At the same time, Moody's compares a loan's interest rate to a benchmark
level, which allows the rating agency to determine the Debt Service Coverage Ration for the loan. Other
loan related issues such as amortization, quality of loan sponsors are all considered. Based on the DSCR ,
LTV and loan level information, a credit enhancement number is generated (Rubin & Levidy, 2000).
When the property level analysis is finished, the rating agency then looks at loan level and portfolio
aspects that may affect the credit enhancement of the conduit pool. Issues such as diversity, trapping of
capital reserves, cross collateralization, information quality and legal structures are all analyzed. When all
the factors are considered, the credit enhancement of the overall pool is determined. Then based on
expected frequency and loss severity, these credit enhancement levels are tranched to different ratings,
and each tranche is assigned a subordination level.
General Methodology for Fixed Rate Conduit Transactions
Source: Moody's Investors Service
Property Level Analysis
Fitch's model is very similar to that of Moody's. Similar to Moody's, Fitch utilizes DSCR to be the
indicator of loan default probability. It then incorporates methods to estimate loss severity. The base
subordination level is determined by multiplying default probability with loss severity of the loan. Then
the rating agency adjusts the base subordination with other pool composition factor to come up with final
subordination level (Vrchota & Kendra, 2001).
S&P's evaluation of a CMBS transaction can be divided into three major areas: the real estate analysis, 2)
pooling and credit support determination, and 3) the legal and financial analysis of the transaction. The
rating agency notes that it is the integration of the results of these analyses that will determine the ultimate
credit support requirements and the final ratings for the transaction43
Subordination Level for the Below Investment Grade Tranches
Moody's Investors Service provides a separate rating methodology for the below investor grade tranches.
According to a recent Moody's report, since below investment grade CMBS bonds are often tranched into
fine slices, the expected loss approach is most relevant to such bonds where, due to higher likelihood of
default, the impact of severity becomes more important (Philipp, Kirnon & Harris, 2001). The investment
grade approach is heavily quantitative, involving portfolio theory scenarios with various multiple of
expected loss. The below investment grade approach is more asset specific. Each loan is "written down"
to a maximum Moody's LTV of 90%, a reserve set aside of sorts. To this, an additional buffer of credit
support is added due to the leveraging of loss and negative pooling effects. The extra credit support
reduces the likelihood of default, which helps offset the potentially greater loss severity. Without the
offsetting credit support, the ratings would be a notch or so lower, paralleling corporate ratings in which
preferred stock is rated lower than senior unsecured due to diminished recovery expectations (Philipp,
2000). The agency also pointed out in a 1999 report that the new default study report by Esaki,
Synderman and L'Heureux is less applicable to its determination of below investment grade levels
because the assessment of risk for such classes is less a portfolio analysis and more a loan-level analysis.
Expectations based on a large sample might be valued for another large, comparable sample. However the
lowest-rated class will not be rescued by the law of averages if a few of the larger loans were to default.
As a result, Moody's determines enhancement levels for the lowest rated classes primarily by assigning
loss reserves to loans that exceed certain target leverage levels and secondarily by portfolio considerations
(Philipp & Gordon, 1999).
In summary, although different rating agencies have very similar approach to above investment grade
tranches, it is unclear whether they have a similar approach to rating the B-pieces.
Different rating methodologies, different subordination level
Some real estate professionals believe that there is probably significant deviation in CMBS underwriting
among rating agencies, depending upon whether the loan-to-value ratio or debt-service coverage is
considered to be more critical as the key determining factor. Accordingly, an issuer may select a
particular agency for a transaction depending on the specific attributes of a target loan portfolio to
maximize profits (Rubin, Barnes, Felletter & Kozel, 1996).
In addition, rating agencies have changed or improved their rating methodologies to provide a better
estimate of credit risk. Fitch, in a recent report, pointed out that modifications in its rating approach have
affected subordination levels. The rating agency also maintains that it will continue to update its
methodology and refine its rating approach as the market matures and new information become available
(Lans & Cain, 2001). Both Moody's and S&P admit that they have changed their rating models since
their original models were based on default data in the early 1990's market, which was very different
from today's market44.
Thus, a rating agency may analyze a transaction differently several years ago when the CMBS market
was still immature. Nonetheless, the different rating methodologies, however similar, result in different
subordination levels.
CHAPTER 6
TREND OF SUB-ORDINATION LEVELS IN THE B-PIECE MARKET
6.1 RECENT SUBORDINATION LEVEL TREND IN THE B-PIECE MARKET
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Subordination trends, especially in the BB and B classes, had been stable for several years until 1999,
according to a research conducted by Salomon Smith Barney 45. However, subordination levels decreased
in both classes in the past two years. In the following section, some explanations of why subordination
levels decreased in the recent two years will be provided.
6.2 ANALYSIS OF SUBORDINATION TREND
Improving Pool Composition
One of the most important determinants in driving the subordination further down in the recent two years
is the change in pool composition.
Prior to the Russian Financial crisis, issuers did not have to concern that much about the subordination
levels because of the relative abundance of liquidity in the B-piece market. However, after the crisis, with
liquidity dried up, issuers had to "sharpen their pencils" in order to attract potential subordinate buyers.
Thus, they started to design new pool composition that would achieve a lower subordination level
approved by the rating agencies.
As discussed in previous chapters, subordination levels in the below investment tranches are heavily
influenced by Loan to Value ratio, as loss severity is a critical concern. Collateral pools now have less
high-risk properties types such as lodging and nursing home. In addition, there are less non-standard
property types such as car washes, movie theatres, and car dealerships (Potthoff & Metz, 2001).
Everything else being equal, these properties require more credit enhancement than other properties types.
From recent CMBS delinquency reports, one can conclude that collateral secured by lodging or healthcare
cash flow have more defaults than other property types (Howard & Carosielli, 2001). Thus, rating
agencies are likely to apply higher cap rates on these properties to derive a higher LTV, which in turn
increase the subordination level. With less high risk and non-standard loans in the transactions, credit
support is expected to trend down.
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As noted in the chart, one can see the percentage of hotel loans securitized has decreased in recent years,
which in turn decreased the subordination level needed because of less real estate risk involved.
Changing Loan Structure
Loan structure has become more complex in recent years, which affect subordination levels. According to
S&P, the distribution of rated classes has changed through out the years. There are now 18% for BB and
14.1% for B class, where the historical average are 13.9% and 10.7% respectively. The drift spectrum of
the rated classes reflects the increased complexity of deal structures.
The most obvious change in loan structure in recent two years has been the introduction of A/B note
structure, which has helped trended down the subordination levels. By splitting a loan into a senior and
junior portion, risk is shifted to the junior portion, which is usually retained by the issuer or privately
placed, instead of included in a CMBS pool. Although the A note has the default probability
commensurate with the whole loan (A+B), the loss severity is reduced since the B note is subordinate to
1998
the A note in a default scenario (Fallick, 2001). Since only the A notes are securitized in a CMBS pool,
pool quality improves. All agencies agreed that the popularity of A/B note concept to improve (lower)
subordination levels46 .
On the other hand, Commercial Mortgage Alert reports that some transactions have one time, non-
senior/subordinate type credit enhancements, such as loan guarantees, or even include AAA/Aaa tranches
from other CMBS transactions 47.
Improving Rating Methodologv
All major credit rating agencies in the CMBS industry admit that they have modified or improved their
rating methodologies. As discussed in chapter 5, a change in rating methodology will affect subordination
levels.
According to an article in Commercial Mortgage Alert48 , Fitch altered its CMBS rating model in 2000.
For conduits, the rating agency changed the way it grades loan diversity. It also started to factor in LTV in
its calculation of subordination levels. The new model, according to Fitch, reflects some refinements on
what Duff and Fitch were previously doing.
Moody's also says that the CMBS group is engaged in an ongoing process of refining rating procedures
and enhancing communications with investors. The rating agency says that it will continue to refine its
approach using the latest available information and modeling tools. Their initial approach was created in
the early 1990's when the real estate market was at its downturn. At that time, the frequency and severity
of defaults from that period has not been documented. Now that the research has become available,
Moody's concluded that investment grade rated tranches had more than adequate loss multiples for even
that scenario. The rating agency has also revisited its macro-economic views of the way in which the real
estate markets work, taking into account the increased role of the capital markets. The agency believes
that there is now less likelihood of the "perfect storm" scenario of sharply rising supply meeting sharply
falling demand. In addition, the agency also incorporates observations from monitoring into the process,
particularly by expecting some credit enhancement built up due to amortization. The rating agency will
continue to focus on the adequacy of CMBS credit support levels and attempt to align them with the
results from the agency's corporate default study. In retrospective, the rating agency admits that some of
the transactions were probably over-enhanced to a degree, and it is the extra buffer that has been trimmed,
but not the core credit enhancement 9 .
S&P explains that its original model was based in the early 1990 life insurance company mortgage default
and loan recovery rates, when loans were significantly different from the structured mortgages being
securitized today. S&P admits that recent strong commercial mortgage market has led to small
adjustments in its criteria, which has in turn led to declining credit support 0.
The view is shared by CMBS research analyst Howard Esaki. Esaki, in an interview, noted that rating
agencies typically are conservative with new investment instruments and gradually reduce subordination
levels. According to Esaki, his default study with Mark Synderman showed that the Aaa/AAA CMBS
was over-enhanced.
With changing rating methodologies, subordination levels across all classes are expected to decrease, as
rating agencies are now less conservative and do not provide as much "buffer" as several years ago. This
helps explain why the subordination levels, including levels in the below investment grade area, have
gone down in recent years.
Increasinz Influence of B-piece buyer
As mentioned in chapter 2, the handful of B-piece buyers are a group of very influential participants in
determining the structure of CMBS, especially after the Russian financial crisis. Since potential B-piece
buyers are going to hold the first loss piece, they are very diligent in looking at deals on a loan-by-loan
basis in order to make their credit decisions. Such B-piece buyer scrutiny, according to the S&P, has been
a primary contributing factor in improving underwriting quality and pool composition and has led to
declining credit support levels52. This phenomenon results in fewer single-tenant properties occupied by
unrated or non-investment grade tenants, less exposure to properties in tertiary markets, and fewer
sponsor inexperienced in owning and managing real estate (Potthoff & Metz, 2001).
Although they were involved to determine the pool composition of CMBS several years ago, B-piece
buyers have become more aggressive about "kicking out" weaker mortgage loans in recent years. S&P
points out that the few B-piece buyers "amassed tremendous buying clout". They have been able to
remove questionable loans from CMBS pools and request that certain property types not be included.
According to Commercial Mortgage Alert, usually the bottom 5-10% of loans is often removed before a
securitization, making the portfolio less risky53. This is especially influential in determining the
subordination levels of the bottom tranches, which usually consist only about 10% of the whole pool.
If the "unwanted" or "questionable" 10% of the proposed pool is removed by the B-piece buyers, the
CMBS pool is in effect being "improved" by that amount. Compared to the older CMBS pools, today's
CMBS pools thus have more protection because of this improvement, and thus subordination levels in the
B-pieces trend down.
Lower LTV
Loan to value has been documented to trend down in recent years. According to Moody's research, LTV
has decreased from its peak in 1998 and has stabilized in recent quarters. It explains that lenders are
originating fewer leveraged loans and loans with high risk property types, because they are afraid these
loans will be removed and they have to warehouse and loans and bear the risk.
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For below investment tranches, high LTV loans are especially harmful, because they contribute a lot to
the loss severity. In the Moody's research report, loans that have a higher than 90% Moody's LTV are
called "offenders", because these loans are considered very high risk by the rating agency and are
penalized by adding additional credit supports. These credit support are meant to protect the below
investment grade pieces. Thus, if there are less "offenders", or high LTV loans, less subordination level
will be needed.
In the research, Moody's noted that there are less high-risk loans in recent pools. According to Moody's,
loans with Moody's LTVs greater than 100% have been nearly eliminated and now constitute less than of
541% of recent deals
Better Market Data
Some market participants contributed the change in subordination levels to better market data and
historical information. S&P believes that there are improvements in the transaction information quality.
Assets securitized in the early 1990s were typically of poorer quality and had little or no historical
information. With improved market data, better risk assessment can be made.
Conclusion
Many participants have questioned the trend of falling subordination levels. However, based on better
pool composition, better structure, increasing B-piece buyers influence, changing rating methodology and
lower LTV are believed to be the most significant contributors to the current change in below investment
grade subordination levels.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we explored the rating agency industry and its influence on the below investment grade
CMBS market. Factors that may cause the subordination levels in the B-piece market to fall in recent
years were also examined. We found that rating agencies play an important role in the below investment
grade market by providing the CMBS industry with a common credit "language". Rating agencies exert
their influence mostly through their evolving credit assessing models, which directly determine the
subordination levels in the B-piece area. However, business models of the CMBS rating industry are not
considered to have significant impact on subordination level decisions. Other non-rating agency related
factors such as change in pool composition, change in CMBS loan structures and increasing scrutiny from
the B-piece buyers are found to account for most of the variations in the subordination levels.
To conclude, rating agencies perform a critical function in providing credit assessment of the CMBS
bonds and other functions that have been extremely beneficial to the CMBS industry. They continue to be
crucial in the CMBS market by assigning ratings and determining subordination levels. However, their
influence may be less in the below investment grade market, as other participants, such as the B-piece
buyers, are exerting a lot of influence in shaping the pool composition, which ultimately affect the
structure and subordination levels of CMBS bonds.
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Responses from Ratings Agencies, Investment Banks and Servicers to the CMSA Investors Forum,
Survey." CMBS World 3.1(2001): 2+.
45 See Wheeler, 2000.
46 Different rating agencies mention about the influence of A/B note. See "Are Levels Too High, Too
low, Just Right?" for Fitch's explanation, "CMBS 2000 Year in Review and 2001 Outlook: Slowing
Economy to Pose Credit Challenges." for Moody's explanation. S&P provides an analysis for A/B
notes in "CMBS Market Witnesses Unexpected Issuance Trends in 2000", an article published in the
CMBS Quarterly Insights by the agency.
47 See Commercial Mortgage Alert article. Anonymous. "Falling Subordination Levels Prompt Debate."
Commercial Mortgage Alert 11 Sept 2000:1+.
48 See Commercial Mortgage Alert article. Anonymous. "Fitch Alters CMBS Rating Model."
Commercial Mortgage Alert 9 Oct 2000:3.
49 See Tad Philipp's response in "Investors Aren't Always Right, Are They? Responses from Ratings
Agencies, Investment Banks and Servicers to the CMSA Investors Forum, Survey." CMBS World
3.1(2001): 2+.
50 See CMBS World article. Various Contributors. "Investors Aren't Always Right, Are They?
Responses from Ratings Agencies, Investment Banks and Servicers to the CMSA Investors Forum,
Survey." CMBS World 3.1(2001): 2+.
s1 See Commercial Mortgage Alert article. "Falling Subordination Levels Prompt Debate." Commercial
Mortgage Alert 11 Sept 2000:1+.
52 See CMBS World article. Various Contributors. "Investors Aren't Always Right, Are They?
Responses from Ratings Agencies, Investment Banks and Servicers to the CMSA Investors Forum,
Survey." CMBS World 3.1(2001): 2+.
53 See Commercial Mortgage Alert article. "Falling Subordination Levels Prompt Debate." Commercial
Mortgage Alert 11 Sept 2000:1+.
54 See Philipp, Tad. "CMBS 2000 Year in Review and 2001 Outlook: Slowing Economy to Pose Credit
Challenges." CMBS World 3.1(2001): 22+.
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